He perceives himself as the one who controls and shapes reality as he pleases. But in the last two years, this has deteriorated slightly. All of this has caused him, out of distress, to spread information in the media about the teams and advisors that he allegedly has and who work under him. This is how important he considers his public image. God forbid any failure should be attributed to him — so the Lebanese public must believe that he is acting with advisors' help.
The equations of retaliations against Israel that he sets down, for example, are a tool for creating certainty for him. They create for him some kind of strategic clarity and reduce uncertainty. He is very aware of these things and it infuriates him. Captain S. A Shiite who wants a livelihood, school for his children, or medical treatment in hospitals, must support Hezbollah.
He also does not understand the economic field. Finance is one of his weak points. But the Lebanese system, as it is built, enables corruption. Each community controls its own sector. He builds ties with the relevant minister in each community, and receives the tenders in the fields of communications, construction, etc. This has allowed him to strengthen his divide-and-conquer policy. We learned to know a Nasrallah most of whose day is not dedicated to the State of Israel, whose existence he has long since come to terms with and identify his weaknesses and sensitive points.
The Israeli public attaches a great deal of weight to his words. The assessments written by these researchers reach the highest levels of authority in the State of Israel and are often the basis for making one decision or another. Much of the material upon which they rely comes from open sources. According to our data, the ratings of his speeches in Lebanon are declining. This is personally affecting him, as someone who cares very much about public perception about him.
In his eyes, these speeches preserve his relevance. They see him. I am still the responsible adult here. For example, the President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun, whose term is expected to end next year. The strangest of them and his most beloved are Gebran Basil, who was formerly the Lebanese foreign minister, but who has been appointed as the heir of Aoun. He served as the chairman of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese parliament [3] and refused to give up his connection to the group even after the United States imposed sanctions on him.
He understands that in Lebanon, Nasrallah is the kingmaker. They hold the presidency. And the man behind the presidency is Nasrallah. His closeness to his community and his alliance with the Christians are the sources of his power. The regional system currently interests him very little.
If two or three years ago, his speeches were full of threats, most of his recent speeches dealt with Lebanese domestic issues. Of course, what was quoted in Israeli media and made headlines were the passages in which he referred to us — responding to the speech of the Chief of Staff at the INSS, warning of escalation towards war against Israel, and laid out his deterrence equation of a city against a city.
But this was only a small part of his message. But if you force me, I will have to respond measure for measure. He only devoted the last five minutes to his words against Israel. He thinks more accurate weapons will produce more balanced deterrence. So, today, every third house in southern Lebanon contains weapons.
Tamir Hayman, clarified that Hezbollah is not interested in war with Israel, but that the round of blows suffered by Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria could cause Nasrallah to act against Israel in a manner that could lead to a round of battle days — which would be limited in terms of their range and destructiveness. He is too preoccupied with domestic Lebanese matters, and is also afraid of being dragged into a war that could lead to many casualties, as happened in the Second Lebanon War.
In the Lebanon Arena section, they repeatedly say that one of the keys to deciphering Nasrallah is to understand that he is faced with an internal identity dilemma.
Nasrallah would pay daily visits to the Shiite mosques of his neighborhood, where he caught the attention of a cleric named Mohammad al-Ghrawi. The sheikh advised him to study theology at an Islamic seminary in the holy city of Najaf in Iraq and gave him a letter of recommendation to the Grand Iraqi Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr the father-in-law of current Iraqi leader Muqtada al-Sadr.
The elder Sadr welcomed Nasrallah to Najaf and placed him under the guidance of another Lebanese cleric named Abbas al-Musawi, who in future years, became the secretary-general of Hizbullah. Musawi, in turn, was a disciple of Sheikh Mohammad Husayn Fadlallah, the current grand ayatollah of the Lebanese Shiites. Fadlallah was also educated in Najaf and completed his studies in The relationship between Nasrallah and Fadlallah remains perfect until today.
His relationship with the leaders of the Iraqi Shiite community explains why so much support for Nasrallah is now being shown in Sadr City for example, and other Shiite districts of Iraq. It explains why when the Shiites were allied to the Americans in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the Bush administration was unable to push too strongly against the arms of Hizbullah. This would have upset the Iraqi Shiites.
Iraq's strongman Saddam Hussein, who came to power in July , accused the Iraqi Shiites of working with their co-religionaries in Iran to topple his secular regime and replace it with a theocracy in Baghdad. It might have been true, since this is what Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Khomeini wanted, and for a rising generation of ambitious Shiites, no figure was more inspiring or influential than Khomeini.
Saddam began a witch-hunt of Shiites throughout Iraq, forcing Hasan Nasrallah to return to Lebanon in order to avoid persecution. The young Nasrallah 19 was very influential and his lessons attracted a large following of Shiite males.
An impassioned lecturer, he taught Islamic history, way of life, and conduct. His students began to look up to him for guidance and leadership, especially after he started expressing his own political views about revolutionary Islam, Lebanese politics, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. He was expelled from Amal in for criticizing the weakness and indecision of its leaders during the Israeli invasion of Beirut. By , he had joined Hizbullah.
Hizbullah was created from the failures of Amal. The party had splintered and lost orientation when its leader and founder Imam Musa al-Sadr disappeared presumably killed by Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi while on a state visit to Libya in He was replaced by Husayn al-Husayni, an uncharismatic political Shiite notable.
At the time, Amal needed military and political leadership, which Husayni could not provide. In turn, Husayni was replaced in by Nabih Berri, a secular lawyer who was pro-Syrian and who had dabbled with the Syrian Baath Party during his early political career.
Both Berri and Husayni, however, lacked Sadr's leadership, charisma, and following in the Shiite community. Berri became a cabinet minister in and Husayni became speaker of parliament in , two jobs that diverted Amal's attention from the daily needs of the Shiites, and preoccupied them with political affairs, while neglecting the military wing of the party. Opposed to Berri's leadership, radical young elements of Amal broke away in With money from Iran, and an initial agenda to create a Iran-like theocracy in Lebanon, they established themselves -- in a press release distributed to the Beirut dailies -- as Hizbullah The Party of God.
It is unknown if the name "Hizbullah" was created by the young Shiites based on a verse in the Holy Quran that says that "The party of God Hizbullah will defeat" or if it was taken from a small and obscure party that operated briefly in Syria in the late s and was called "Hizbullah. Regardless, Nasrallah became involved in the military affairs of Hizbullah, which immediately clashed with Amal and, in , he succeeded in driving Amal militias out of Shiite districts in the suburbs of Beirut.
In June , Hizbullah highjacked TWA Flight , forcing it to land at Beirut airport and taking hostages, who were only released after Israel released Lebanese prisoners. During this time, Nasrallah became famous in Hizbullah. He realized the strength of his abilities and decided to become a Shiite leader in his own right. He could not do that, however, with his limited religious training, so he temporarily laid down his guns and went to Qom in Iran to complete his education in Shiite Islam.
Religious credentials were -- and still are, a must for an ambitious Shiite wanting to lead in his community. He was wounded in battle, further enhancing his reputation, and became a member of the party's central committee at the age of 29 in Hizbullah agreed to release Western hostages it had captured during the war and support Syria in its final war against General Michel Aoun, the army commander and prime minister of Lebanon, who was ruling against Syria's will from Baabda Palace.
In return, Syria and Iran refused to disarm Hizbullah, as the case with all other military groups that laid down their weapons in the post-war era. Hizbullah was not a militia, they argued, but a resistance group created to liberate South Lebanon from Israel. Since the South remained occupied, they claimed, then Hizbullah would remain armed.
Wanting to put an end to the bloody war, most parties agreed -- although most did so unwillingly. Yet Nasrallah focused his attack on the Saudis, mainly due to the Iranian-Saudi animosity.
Over the span of ten evenings, Nasrallah covered subjects that varied between faith and war. He has Lebanon under his thumb and thinks he will eventually rehabilitate Assad — now an Iranian vassal — by restoring his ties with Lebanese politicians and easing Assad's international isolation. Nasrallah perceives himself, his party, and Lebanon as being in an alliance with Iran and Assad, in a bloody fight with a rival alliance that he claims to consist of Israel and Saudi Arabia, and he threatens both: Israel of destruction and Saudi Arabia of division.
While Nasrallah did not announce major shifts in his party's position, his speeches were a good update on where Hezbollah — and more so Iran — stand on the region's various issues and its endlessly complicated problems. Analysis What does Nasrallah want? Hezbollah chief's annual series of speeches update Hezbollah's stand on region's various issues and complicated problems Please contact us for subscription options. Qatar says it would be 'wishful thinking' to have regional unity on Syria.
Lebanon's information minister says ready to resign amid crisis with Gulf states. Turkey bans Iraq, Syria, Yemen nationals' travel to Belarus until further notice. Saudi-led coalition claims to have killed Houthi fighters in 24 hours. Yasser Arafat's nephew renews accusation of Israeli role in Palestinian icon's death. We use cookies in a limited and restricted manner for specific purposes.
For more details, you can see "our data policy". July 12, - Hezbollah militants cross the border into Israel and capture two soldiers during a raid; a day conflict ensues. September 22, - Nasrallah makes his first public appearance since the beginning of the conflict in July, addressing hundreds of thousands of people at a rally in Beirut. November 30, - In a speech broadcast on television, Nasrallah calls for peaceful protests to secure the resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the creation of a national unity government.
The next day, security sources estimate that at least , protesters gather in the streets of Beirut. May - Declares the government's move to shut down Hezbollah's communications network "a declaration of open war. May 21, - After five days of talks, representatives from the Hezbollah-led opposition and Lebanon's Western-backed government reach an agreement ending the month political crisis.
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